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Agents operating in illegal markets cannot resort to the justice system to guarantee property 
rights, to enforce contracts, or to seek protection from competitors’ improper behaviors. In 
these contexts, violence is used to enforce previous agreements and to fight for market 
share. This relationship plays a major role in the debate on the pernicious effects of the 
illegality of drug trade. This paper explores a singular episode of transition of a market from 
legal to illegal to provide a first piece of evidence on the causal effect of illegality on systemic 
violence. Brazil has historically been the main world producer of big leaf mahogany (a tropical 
wood). Starting in the 1990s, policies restricting extraction and trade of mahogany, 
culminating with prohibition, were implemented. First, we present evidence that large scale 
mahogany trade persisted after prohibition, through misclassification of mahogany exports as 
“other tropical timber species.” Second, we document relative increases in violence after 
prohibition in areas with: (i) higher share of mahogany exports before prohibition; (ii) higher 
suspected illegal mahogany activity after prohibition; and (iii) natural occurrence of 
mahogany. We believe this is one of the first documented experiences of increase in violence 
following the transition of a market from legal to illegal. 
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Agents operating in illegal markets cannot resort to the justice system to guarantee property 
rights, to enforce contracts, or to seek protection from competitors’ improper behaviors. In 
these contexts, violence is used to enforce previous agreements and to fight for market 
share. This relationship plays a major role in the debate on the pernicious effects of the 
illegality of drug trade. This paper explores a singular episode of transition of a market from 
legal to illegal to provide a first piece of evidence on the causal effect of illegality on systemic 
violence. Brazil has historically been the main world producer of big leaf mahogany (a tropical 
wood). Starting in the 1990s, policies restricting extraction and trade of mahogany, 
culminating with prohibition, were implemented. 
 
We present evidence of the increase in violence in Brazilian regions with natural occurrence 
or trade of mahogany, following the introduction of increasingly restrictive regulations and 
eventual prohibition of mahogany exploration. Much has been said in the popular press and 
the academic literature about the intrinsic association between market illegality and the use 
of violence. Still, there is very little if any direct causal evidence on this relationship. We 
present what we believe is the first piece of evidence on the increase in violence following the 
complete shutdown of a legal market. The increase in homicides we document is not related 
to changes in socioeconomic conditions, pre-existing trends in violence, or pernicious or 
degrading effects of the consumption of the good itself. Our evidence points to a causal effect 
of market illegality, per se, on the incidence of systemic violence. 
 1
1.Introduction
Agents operating in illegal markets cannot resort to the justice system to uphold
contracts, to guarantee property rights, or to seek protection from competitors’ improper
behaviors. Instead, in these contexts, violence is used to enforce previous agreements and to
fight for market share (for a case study, see Mieczkowski, 1990). This relationship plays a major
role in the current debate on the pernicious effects of the illegality of drug trade and the War
on Drugs (see, for example, Nadelmann, 1989, Miron and Zwiebel, 1995, The Economist, 2001,
and Keefer and Loayza, 2010). Historical episodes such as the American alcohol prohibition and
the Opium Wars in China seem to support this view, but there is scant causal evidence on the
effect of illegality on violence and skeptical views are common (see Naylor, 2009, or discussion
in Fagan and Chin, 1990, and Donohue et al, 2011). Randomized experiments in this setting
seem virtually impossible, while institutional changes leading to transitions of markets from
legal to illegal – which could be used as natural experiments – are extremely rare.
This paper explores a singular episode of transition of a market from legal to illegal to
provide a first piece of causal evidence on the increase in violence following the complete
shutdown of a legal market. Brazil has historically been the main world producer of big leaf
mahogany, an extremely valuable tropical wood.
1 From the end of the 1990s to the early 2000s,
the Brazilian government implemented a series of policies progressively restricting the
extraction and trade of mahogany, culminating with prohibition in late 2001. We analyze yearly
data at the municipality level, using structural breaks and difference-in-differences estimation
strategies, to show that mahogany extraction persisted and was associated with increased
violence after prohibition. Our identification trusts on the timing of implementation of
restrictions to the mahogany trade and on three pieces of information on the relevance of
mahogany for a given region. We have data on the natural occurrence of mahogany in the
Brazilian territory, on state level mahogany exports before prohibition, and on exports of “other
tropical timber species” after prohibition. Combinations of these variables can be used to
explore double differences on timing of change to illegality and relevance of mahogany for a
1 Grogan et al (2002) claim that mahogany is one of the most valuable woods in the world, with the price per cubic
meter for a high quality variety around US$ 1,200 in 2001. The area of natural occurrence of big leaf mahogany is
restricted to Central America and to the South American region of the Amazon. The total Brazilian production of
mahogany between 1971 and 2001 is estimated to have been of the order of US$ 4 billion, with 75%
corresponding to exports to the US and Europe (Grogan et al, 2002).2
given area, and also triple differences on timing of change, availability, and economic
importance.
In particular, we first follow and extend the work of Chimeli and Boyd (2010) and
present evidence that large scale mahogany trade persisted after prohibition, through
misclassification of mahogany exports as exports of “other tropical timber species.” Following,
we document relative increases in homicide rates after prohibition in: (i) states with higher
share of total mahogany exports before prohibition; (ii) states suspected of higher illegal
mahogany activity after prohibition; and (iii) municipalities within the area of natural
occurrence of mahogany. Our main results persist if the sample is restricted to states with some
natural occurrence of mahogany or even only to the state of Pará, which accounts for more
than 70% of exports in the pre-prohibition period. The increase in violence after prohibition
does not seem to be determined by changes in socioeconomic conditions, agricultural activity,
urbanization, public security expenditures, or overall mortality rates, and is not associated with
pre-existing trends in homicide rates. In addition, we are able to characterize the typical victim
of the increase in violence as prime-aged single males. We believe that the evidence presented
here constitutes one of the first documented experiences of increase in violence following the
transition of a market from legal to illegal.
Our paper is probably most closely related to the literature on illegal drugs and violence.
There is a vast literature outside economics with case studies or descriptive analysis of the
patterns and incidence of crime and violence among drug users and sellers (see papers in De La
Rosa et al, 1990). In economics, Miron (1999 and 2001) explores time series and cross-country
data on enforcement of alcohol and drug policies, and finds a positive correlation between
enforcement and homicides. In the first case, the historical experience of the US is analyzed and
identification comes from time series variation in enforcement, which is potentially
endogenous to violence itself. In the second case, identification comes from cross-sectional
country level variation with a reduced number of countries, so that omitted variables and
outliers are potential concerns. Medina and Martínez (2003) use variation in drug prohibition
enforcement across Colombian municipalities between 1991 and 1998 and find no systematic
relationship between enforcement and crime, though again endogeneity may be an issue.
Mejía and Restrepo (2011) show that increases in the demand for Colombian coca due to3
external shocks (changes in repressive policies abroad) are associated with relative increases in
violence in areas adequate for coca cultivation.
A number of recent papers tries to deal directly with the relationship between market
illegality and crime and violence. Adda et al (2010) explore an episode of decriminalization of
cannabis possession in a London borough between 2001 and 2002. They find that
decriminalization was associated with increases in drug related offenses and reductions in other
types of offenses (as police shifted resources towards non-drug related crimes). Owens (2011a)
uses state level data and presents evidence that increases in violence in the 1920s US were
mostly driven by demographic trends, bearing almost no relationship with the criminalization of
alcohol markets. Still, Owens (2011b) shows that criminalization of alcohol led to a change in
the distribution of homicides towards ages 20 to 30, suggesting that indeed it was associated
with the emergence of organized crime and systemic violence (partly offset by the reduction in
homicides in other age-groups due to reduced consumption).
As Adda et al (2010) and Owens (2011a and 2011b), we use an institutional change that
can be seen as a natural experiment on the effect of illegality. But, differently from Adda et al
(2010), we analyze the complete shutdown of a market, rather than changes in the criminal
status of consumers in a specific location. And, differently from Owens (2011a and 2011b), we
analyze the incidence of violence in a market unrelated to “vice” goods (drugs, alcohol,
prostitution, etc), so that we immediately isolate what is sometimes termed “systemic”
violence, as opposed to violence that may arise due to the consumption of the good itself or to
intrinsic characteristics of consumers. Our municipality data and the characteristics of
mahogany allow us to be much more precise about the locations where violence should be
occurring and to link it explicitly to the production side of the market. Therefore, our setting is
more adequate for the analysis of the overall effect of prohibition on the incidence of systemic
violence. The results suggest that prohibition, per se, is associated with increased violence.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a background of
mahogany trade and policy in recent decades in Brazil. Section 3 presents the data used in the
paper. Section 4 describes our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results related to
mahogany trade after prohibition. Section 6 presents the results on prohibition of mahogany
trade and violence. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper.4
2. Background
2.1 Mahogany Policy in Brazil
Big leaf mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla King) is a native species of the Americas,
originally ranging from Mexico to the Amazon region in South America. The durability, color and
malleability of the timber from this tree are the main reasons for the high prices it fetches in
international markets and have led to its intense exploration over the years. Most of the
remaining big leaf mahogany trees are located in the Amazon forest, and Brazil was the largest
exporter of the species prior to prohibition of production and trade by the local government in
2001. Brazilian production was mainly exported to the United States and European high-end
furniture and construction markets.
Exploration of Brazilian mahogany in the 1980s and 1990s, even under heavy regulation,
contributed to increased concerns by domestic and international environmentalists who argued
that continued extraction would soon lead to extinction. Although this statement has been
disputed,
2 a series of stricter regulations were introduced by the Brazilian government starting
in the early 1990s to curb extraction. These included: (i) export quotas limiting international
sales to 150,000 m
3, 65,000 m
3 and 30,000 m
3 in 1990, 1998 and 2001 respectively; (ii)
moratorium on the issuance of new forest management plans to back up mahogany extraction
starting in July 1996; (iii) creation of a working group to audit forest management plans
(required for mahogany extraction to take place), which led to the suspension of 85% of all
management plans in March 1999; and (iv) prohibition of extraction, transportation and
domestic or international trade of mahogany in October 2001. Finally, big leaf mahogany was
listed on appendix II of the United Nations Convention of International Trade of Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in November 2002 (this regulation came into force in
November 2003). Inclusion of a species in appendix II of CITES requires careful monitoring of
international trade by both the exporting and importing countries. This, in turn, might have
reinforced the impetus for maintaining the more stringent outright prohibition already imposed
by Brazilian authorities.
3 Institutionally, the two main restrictions were those introduced in
March 1999 – when 85% of the management licenses were suspended – and October 2001 –
when mahogany extraction was finally prohibited.
2 See Roozen (1998) and cited references.
3 See IBAMA (1999), Grogan et al (2002), and Lentine et al (2003).5
Despite tightened regulations, mounting evidence points to the continuing smuggling of
big leaf mahogany formally exported under the guise of “other tropical timber species.” In a
recent article, Chimeli and Boyd (2010) analyze official export data to show that Brazilian
exports under the trade category “other tropical timber species” jumped by 1,800% in a single
month in 1999 and were sustained at volumes comparable to those of former exports of big
leaf mahogany. They estimate structural breaks in the series for “other tropical timber species”
and verify that these regime changes closely match regulatory changes in the big leaf
mahogany market. An especially strong structural break takes place following the suspension of
85% of all forest management plans in March 1999. They also explore alternative explanations
for the jumps in exports of “other tropical timber species,” but only to find further evidence
that these correspond to smuggling of mahogany through formal export channels.
4
But how can mahogany be smuggled out of the country through formal export
channels? Selected timber species from the Amazon (mahogany, Brazilian cedar, ipe, virola-
balsa, and louro) have separate international trade codes that exporters have to specify when
they sell their product (Common Mercosur Nomenclature – NCM, chapter 44). In addition to
these, there is an aggregate residual trade code that encompasses “other tropical timber
species” (NCM 4407.29.90).
Exporters (or hired export companies) have to produce an invoice specifying the
quantity and value of the transaction and have to fill out two export forms (“Registro de
Exportação,” or Export Registry, and “Declaração de Despacho de Exportação,” or Declaration
of Export Dispatch). Both these forms specify the NCM code of the exported good, and this is
the point at which exporters have the opportunity to list mahogany as another species. Finally,
an outsourced customs dispatcher is then responsible for presenting the cargo at the port.
While import tariffs are common in Brazil, the same is not true for export taxes. As a
result, the likelihood of inspection at the port (“yellow light” or “red light” levels of monitoring)
is much lower for exports than for imports. This gives exporters an opportunity to smuggle
mahogany as a different species (which is subject to less stringent regulations).
5 Once
4 Theoretical discussions of contexts in which more stringent regulations may backfire can be found in Bulte and
Van Kooten (1999) and Becker et al (2006). Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) provide a more general discussion of the
relative advantages and disadvantages of quantity regulations.
5 In addition, identification of mahogany by physical inspection is extremely difficult and requires an expert with
knowledge of mahogany and, additionally, of andiroba, cedar, and curupixá, species that can be easily mistaken by6
mahogany is smuggled, the exporter is paid the invoice value through regular export
procedures and the importer obtains a cargo complete with formal documentation.
Figure 1 presents the aggregate series for Brazil of mahogany and “other tropical timber
species” exports, between 1989 and 2007. It is clear that the declining trend of mahogany
exports after the introduction of restrictions is accompanied by a rising trend in exports of
“other tropical timber species.”
6 In order to illustrate this point, the figure also presents the
sum of the two series, which displays a more stable pattern. The aggregate series do suggest
that legal mahogany exports were replaced by illegal exports under the guise of “other tropical
timber species.” Prior accounts by Blundell and Rodan (2003), Barreto and Souza (2001), and
Gerson (2000) describe this same phenomenon. Apprehensions from as recently as early 2010
provide additional anecdotal evidence that Brazilian mahogany was systematically exported as
species falling under the general category “other tropical timber species” (see, for example,
Diário do Pará, 2010).
The existing evidence suggests that regulations that significantly reduced exports of big
leaf mahogany and finally culminated into outright prohibition created an active illegal market.
Grogran et al (2002) estimate the total value of mahogany exports between 1971 and 2001 to
be around US$ 4 billion. This value averages US$ 129 million per year, corresponding to 1.2% of
the aggregate GDP of the state of Pará in 2000 (Pará accounted for more than 70% of total
mahogany exports before prohibition). This highlights the relevance of this potential market to
the local economy. Furthermore, the peculiar characteristics of the smuggling of Brazilian
mahogany allow us to track down this illegal activity. This provides us with a unique opportunity
to test the hypothesis that illegal markets are associated with increased violence.
2.2 Violence and the Illegal Mahogany Market
The role of violence in markets operating outside the scope of the legal system has
received some theoretical attention. Donohue and Levitt (1998), for example, analyze the
efficiency of allocations in these markets, arguing that it is directly related to the cost of fighting
and the uncertainty regarding final outcomes of a fight. Reuter (1985 and 2009) argues that
it. As recently as 2011, there are studies being conducted on the identification of mahogany based on equipment
using infrared light (O Globo, 2011). These have as main objective the development of technologies to facilitate
detection and reduce the illegal trade of mahogany.
6 Some export of mahogany after prohibition in 2001 is registered, since exports from specimens extracted before
prohibition were allowed under certain circumstances.7
these markets are typically organized in such a way that “firms” are small and short-lived, and
tend to interact much more through competition than collusion. These would be consequences
of lack of access to external credit markets, of the attention drawn by large firms, and of the
difficulty and high risk of using violence to maintain centralized control, all of which would
imply negative returns to firm size. He also argues that, in illegal markets, violence characterizes
not only interactions between competitors, but within organizations, from labor disputes to
reputation building and managerial successions.
In relation to the particular case of violence in connection with illegal logging, anecdotal
evidence abounds both in Brazil and elsewhere (see, for example, Greenpeace, 2001 and 2004,
and Hance, 2010). It is easy to find reports that discuss illegal logging as intrinsically related to
the widespread use of violence.
7 News from private media outlets, non-governmental
organizations, and official media document time and again the use of violence in the illegal
mahogany market and give indications of the scale of this criminal activity.
In the Brazilian Amazon, protected timber species are stolen from private land
(Comissão Pastoral da Terra, 2011), indigenous and conservation areas (Soares, 2003, O Liberal,
2002, and Universo Online, 2004), and public land (Soares, 2003, Universo Online, 2004, and
Mendes, 2005). Intimidation driven deals with indigenous tribe leaders are also commonly
reported (Mendes, 2004). Whereas illegal extraction of mahogany already occurred before
prohibition in association with fraudulent forest management plans, Mendes (2005) documents
an increase in organized crime in Pará following prohibition.
In the process of extracting mahogany, loggers are said to resort to illegally obtained
weapons and “threat execution of whoever may offer any resistance” (Soares, 2003). Threats
and murders of rural workers, non-governmental organization leaders, and government
officials attempting to disrupt the functioning of the illegal mahogany market have been widely
publicized. For example, Adilson Prestes, a landless rural worker, was murdered by gun shots in
the town of Novo Progresso, Pará, on July 3, 2004, allegedly for having denounced to local
authorities extraction of mahogany in public and indigenous lands and a clandestine cemetery
(Universo Online, 2004). At the other end of the political spectrum, a former president (2001-
2002) of the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Natural Resources (IBAMA) received
7 For example, Hance’s (2010) interview article on Indonesia is titled “Violence a part of the illegal timber trade,
says kidnapped activist.”8
death threats because of his role in the prohibition of mahogany extraction and trade (O
Liberal, 2002). The investigative commission for bio-piracy of the Brazilian House of
Representatives also documented death threats to two other IBAMA staff members in Pará
(Câmara dos Deputados, 2005). According to Mendes (2005), organized crime in the region has
two main activities: intensive exploration of mahogany and other species in public and
protected land, and illegal sales of public land. In this process, loggers command a small army of
men ready to perform acts of sabotage, intimidation, and murder of rural workers, union
leaders, and human rights militants.
Reports from the media suggest a significant depth of the so-called “mahogany mafia,”
and a Federal Police officer has compared its market to that for narcotics (O Estado de São
Paulo, 2002). While describing individuals involved in this trade, the same officer states that
“we are not dealing with small transgressors, but a mafia (…). They use violence, move large
fortunes and coerce the small guys.” Allegations of this nature led to a formal arraignment by a
prosecutor in the state of Pará. According to its report, the “mahogany mafia” – who illegally
extracted the timber to be sold in international markets – built clandestine roads, bridges, and
airstrips, assembled a “war arsenal,” exploited slave labor, and owned 38 vehicles (mainly
trucks), a ferry boat, and airplanes (Ministério Público do Estado do Pará, 2002). Influential
politicians, indigenous tribe leaders, and public officials from federal and local governments
have also been accused of involvement in the illegal mahogany market (Mendes, 2005).
In the following sections, we first test for structural breaks in the Brazilian exports of
“other tropical timber species.” We then compare the estimated breaks with the dates when
Brazilian authorities imposed restrictions on the mahogany market. These regime changes can
serve as benchmarks to test the effect of prohibition on violence.
3. Data
Mahogany Variables
In order to conduct our exercise, we need some indicator of the relevance of mahogany
in certain areas of the country. We use different pieces of information to construct such
indicator. First, Grogan et al (2002), based on Lamb (1966) and on field work conducted by the
authors, provide a map indicating the area of natural occurrence of mahogany in the Brazilian
territory (the same map is presented by Lentini et al, 2003, and is reproduced here in Appendix9
A.1). We superimpose this map on a map of the political division of Brazil into municipalities
and create a dummy variable equal to 1 if a municipality is located within the area of natural
occurrence of mahogany.
8
Given the difficulty of access in the Brazilian Amazon, where the mahogany occurrence
area is concentrated, the former variable may not be a very precise indicator of the actual
relevance of mahogany in a certain region. For remote areas, with costly transportation, natural
occurrence may not be enough to warrant profitable exploration. So we also construct variables
trying to capture the economic relevance of mahogany in different regions. We have state level
information on the total exports of mahogany (in kilograms) before prohibition, starting from
1989. Based on this information, we create a variable indicating the state share in total exports
of mahogany before 1999. Exports can be done by a state that does not produce mahogany, in
case an exporting company buys wood from a producing state. Still, more than 90% of
mahogany exports come from the region of natural occurrence of mahogany, with more than
70% coming from the state of Pará, which is typically identified as the main producer and the
area where most of the illegal logging takes place (see, for example, Greenpeace, 2001).
Finally, we also use information on exports of “other tropical timber species” by state,
from 1989 and 2007. We use this information to present evidence on the continuing
exploration and trade of mahogany after prohibition and as a proxy for the extent of illegal
logging taking place in different states.
The data on exports of mahogany and other type of tropical timber come from the
Brazilian Secretariat on International Trade, from the Ministry of Development, Industry and
International Trade (from its “Análise das Informações de Comércio Exterior,” or Analysis of
Information on International Trade, available at aliceweb.desenvolvimento.gov.br). The two
export categories we analyze in this paper are monthly exports in Kg of mahogany and “other
tropical timber species” for all exporting states of Brazil, from January 1989 to March 2010. To
construct these series we took into account a change in export codes that took place in 1996.
8 For the state of Pará, the main producer of mahogany before prohibition, Greenpeace (2001) presents a map
indicating locations of legal mahogany logging and locations where investigations uncovered illegal mahogany
extraction. It is reassuring that these locations are all within the area of natural occurrence of mahogany indicated
by our variable and imply an overall distribution of mahogany activity very similar to that suggested by the map
from Groggan et al (2002).10
The precise strategy used to match the codes before and after 1996 is described in detail in
Appendix A.2.
Outcome Variable
Our outcome variable, used as an indicator for the incidence of violence, is the homicide
rate per 100,000 inhabitants. This variable is available yearly at the municipality level from the
Brazilian Ministry of Health integrated system of information (www.datasus.gov.br). Homicide
rates are thought to have higher reporting than other types of violence (Soares, 2004), and the
unified system of public health from the Brazilian government warrants a certain uniformity in
definition across regions. The homicide data are available yearly since the early 1980s.
9
Control Variables
The choice of control variables is guided by our main empirical concerns, which we
discuss in detail in the next section. Our goal is to account for other relevant changes possibly
taking place simultaneously and maybe determined by the prohibition of mahogany trade, and
which may also affect the incidence of violence.
Few variables are available yearly at the municipality level, so we also use several state
level controls in our analysis. Most of the state level variables come from the Brazilian National
Household Survey (“Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios”) and were tabulated by the
Institute for Applied Economic Research (“Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada,” available
from www.ipeadata.gov.br), a think tank from the Brazilian government. These include: poverty
rate, ratio of income per capita of the top 10% of the income distribution to the bottom 40%,
percentage of households with more than 2 members per room, enrollment rate between ages
7 and 14, percentage of informal workers in the labor force, percentage of population living in
households with access to treated water, percentage of population living in households with
toilet connected to the public sewerage system, illiteracy rate in the population above 15,
percentage of the labor force occupied in agriculture and fishing, and unemployment rate.
Other state level data include household electricity consumption per capita from the Brazilian
Census Bureau (“Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística,” or IBGE) statistical yearbook
9 The main police forces in Brazil are run by states. For the vast majority of Northern states (those in the mahogany
area), institutional development is quite weak and there are no consistent municipality level series for crime rates
available from the police forces. So our only alternative is to look at homicide rates based on mortality data.11
and government expenditures on public security per capita (from the Brazilian Ministry of
Finance).
At the municipality level, we have total area planted (from the municipal agricultural
surveys from IBGE) and mortality data by cause of death (from the Brazilian Ministry of Health).
We also use municipality level data on number of political deaths associated with land conflicts
(collected by the “Comissão Pastoral da Terra,” a catholic organization that monitors and tries
to mediate land related conflicts in Brazil).
Variables constructed from the PNAD are available, under a consistent methodology,
since 1992, but for the years 1994 and 2000, when the survey did not take place. Household
electricity consumption is not available for the year 1997, while the other state level variables
are available for all years between 1992 and 2007. Within this time interval, the municipality
data (area planted and mortality) are available for all years.
Given the availability of data, the creation of a large number of municipalities in Brazil in
the early 1990s, and the fact that the policies we want to analyze were introduced only in the
end of the 1990s, we restrict our sample to the period between 1995 and 2007. Still,
regressions including all controls lose part of the observations within this time interval.
Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 2 present descriptive statistics for the three samples of
municipalities that will be used throughout the paper: the entire country of Brazil, only states
with some natural occurrence of mahogany, and only the state of Pará. Table 1 presents
averages of homicide rates, access to treated water, and gdp per capita for municipalities
outside and inside the mahogany occurrence areas, for the entire country.
10 Table 2 presents
the same descriptive statistics, but first only for municipalities in states with some natural
occurrence of mahogany, and then only for municipalities in the state of Pará.
11 Table 1 makes
clear that mahogany regions are typically poorer and with less access to public goods than
other regions of Brazil. Also, mahogany regions start with lower homicide rates, but surpass the
countrywide rates by 2007. Table 2 shows that the differences in socioeconomic characteristics
10 We do have data on gdp per capita for some years, but do not use it in our later empirical exercises since it
would imply a substantial loss in terms of number of observations. Still, results are very similar when we control
for gdp per capita, even with the loss in number of observations (available from the authors upon request).
11 To keep a consistent sample and a balanced panel in the later analysis, we concentrate on municipalities that
already existed in 1995 (there were some municipalities created during the period of our analysis). Results and
descriptive statistics are identical if we also include municipalities created during the period.12
become much milder when we look at more homogeneous areas, either states with some
mahogany occurrence or only the state of Pará.
Figure 2 plots the homicide rates series from Tables 1 and 2. The patterns mentioned
before become even clearer, and the dates of the main interventions in the prohibition of
mahogany do seem to be associated with relative increases in homicide rates in mahogany
occurring areas. Particularly striking is the pattern observed in the state of Pará, where the
evolution of homicides was almost identical between mahogany and non-mahogany occurring
areas before prohibition, but a gap opens up immediately after the first major restriction to
logging in 1999. Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 2 suggest that prohibition may indeed have had an
effect on violence, but they also highlight the challenges implicit in our empirical exercise.
4. Empirical Strategy
4.1 Illegal Mahogany Trade after Prohibition: Structural Break Estimation
We first provide evidence that exports of mahogany continued after prohibition,
through misclassification of mahogany exports as exports of “other tropical timber species.” In
order to do so, we show that the historical series of exports of “other tropical timber species”
experienced huge increases in quantity (kilograms) following the introduction of the most
severe restrictions on mahogany extraction and trade. To develop this argument formally, we
follow Bai and Perron (1998) and test for endogenous structural breaks in the series and check
whether the dates identified by the model match the timing of introduction of restrictions in
the mahogany market. This same exercise was conducted for the aggregate monthly series for
Brazil by Chimeli and Boyd (2010). Here we extend their analysis by formally controlling for
exports of some selected species, in an attempt to account for widespread movements in the
markets for tropical woods and substitution from mahogany to other varieties. We also
perform the same tests with yearly series (which tend to be less noisy than monthly series).
Consider a step function with m structural breaks determining m+1 distinct regimes:
yt = δj + xt’β + ut with 1 1, , j j t T T     and 1, , j m   , (1)
where yt is the observed dependent variable, δj are regime specific averages (regime specific
coefficients of regression of yt on a vector of 1’s), xt and β are covariates and associated13
coefficients, ut is the possibly autocorrelated and heteroskedastic disturbance at time t, and
T1,..., Tm are the break points to be estimated.
Estimation of these breakpoints initially requires calculation of the minimum sum of
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Next, Bai and Perron (1998) use a dynamic programming algorithm to compute the
minimum ST(T1, ... , Tm) over all admissible partitions, yielding the estimated breakpoints
1 1 , , 1 ˆ ˆ ( , , ) argmin ( , , ).
m m T T T m T T S T T     (3)
Finally, to determine the number of breaks in the series, we employ a set of statistics
derived by Bai and Perron (1998) to first test the null hypothesis of no breaks versus the
alternative of m = b breaks, and then to test the null hypothesis of l breaks against l+1 breaks.
We also conduct the same exercises controlling for exports of cedar, ipe and virola-
balsa. Cedar and ipe are imperfect substitutes for mahogany, mainly due to their durability, and
jumps in their exports could reflect systematic changes in demand for timber from the Amazon
as a response to mahogany prohibition. Virola-balsa is a softer type of timber with very
different uses from mahogany. We include it to capture overall movements in the international
markets that might also be correlated with jumps in exports of “other tropical timber species.”
4.2 Mahogany Prohibition and Violence: Differences-in-Differences
The dimensions of variation we explore to identify the causal effect of prohibition on
violence are the timing of the institutional changes and the differential relevance of mahogany
across different areas of the country. In principle, if the increase in homicide rates after
prohibition is larger in mahogany occurring or producing areas, it could be attributed to
prohibition.
The timing of the intervention considered here is unique for the entire country. So
identification of the effect of prohibition comes from the heterogeneous response of different
areas to prohibition, rather than from differential timing of treatment. Areas with no mahogany
related activity should experience no significant changes in the incidence of violence due to
12 By admissible partition of the time domain, we mean partitions T1,..., Tm such that each regime lasts for no less
than a given pre-determined time length h greater than the number of regressors in the model.14
prohibition (apart from general equilibrium effects, which are likely to be small), while areas
with some type of mahogany activity should experience increases in violence.
Given the institutional discussion from section 2 and the evidence to be presented in the
next section, we focus on two particular years as key moments in the increasing trend towards
mahogany trade prohibition. First, we create a dummy variable equal to 1 for the interval
between 1999 and 2001, capturing the first major step towards prohibition (suspension of 85%
of the operating licenses for management plans). Following, we create a second dummy
variable equal to 1 for 2002 and all following years, corresponding to the final prohibition of
mahogany trade instituted on October 2001.
13
Our benchmark specification is the following:
Homicideit = α + β1.(D1999≤t≤2001 × Mahog_Vari)+ β2.(Dt≥2002 × Mahog_Vari) (4)
+ zit’γ + θi + μt + εit,
where Homicideit indicates the homicide rate for municipality i in year t; D1999≤t≤2001 is a dummy
variable equal to 1 for the years between 1999 and 2001; Dt≥2002 is a dummy variable equal to 1
for 2002 and all following years; Mahog_Vari is some variable indicating the relevance of
mahogany in municipality i (to be discussed in the next paragraph); zit is a vector of control
variables; θi is a municipality fixed-effect; µt is a year fixed-effect; εit is a random term; and α,
β1, β2, and γ are parameters. Under the usual assumptions, E[εit| Dt≥1999, Dt≥2002, Mahog_Vari, zit,
θi, μt] = 0, and OLS estimation of the above equation provides unbiased estimates of the β’s. In
this hypothetical setting, the random term εit is not correlated with the independent variables,
so OLS estimates of the β’s indeed provide the parameters of interest: the causal impact of
mahogany trade restrictions on homicide rates.
We use three pieces of data to identify the relevance of mahogany in a given area
(Mahog_Vari). First, we use information on the area of natural occurrence of mahogany. From
that, we create a dummy variable equal to 1 for municipalities that are in the mahogany
occurring area. But natural occurrence of mahogany may not be enough for its trade to be an
important activity, given that it may not be economically profitable to explore mahogany in
remote and difficult to access areas. So we also use information on mahogany exports before
13 We present here only results including both treatment variables simultaneously. Results tend to be stronger
when we consider only one treatment (either from 1999 or from 2002 onwards). These results are available from
the authors upon request.15
prohibition and exports of “other tropical timber species” after prohibition. This information is
available only at the state level, so we create two variables: one indicating the share of the
state in aggregate mahogany exports between 1989 and 1998 (before prohibition), and another
indicating the total amount of yearly “suspected mahogany exports,” both before and after
prohibition. The second variable is constructed simply by adding the series of mahogany and
“other tropical timber species” exports, on the assumption that the latter represented illegal
mahogany exports. The first variable gives a measure of the importance of mahogany to the
local economy before prohibition, while the second gives an estimate of mahogany activity
which includes the illegal period (in reality, we only use the post-prohibition period as
treatment, but the pre-prohibition period is also useful in some of our robustness exercises).
These variables capture export activity, but not necessarily extraction, since non-
mahogany producing states can also be exporters (though, in reality, this is a rare event). Since
each of the suggested variables has advantages and disadvantages, we use all of them as
treatments in our analysis. In addition, we go one step further and create treatment variables
that are the product of one of the export variables (state share in mahogany exports before
prohibition or “suspected mahogany exports” after prohibition) and the dummy variable for
mahogany occurrence area. These treatments correspond to triple differences in timing of
prohibition, natural mahogany occurrence, and relative importance of mahogany activity
(either before prohibition or supposed illegal activity afterwards). We have therefore five
treatment variables that we use throughout the paper, two of them trusting only on state level
variation (export related variables) and three trusting on municipality level variation (mahogany
occurrence area and triple differences using interactions of area with exports).
In our context, there are two potential problems with the difference-in-differences
strategy: omitted variables and differential dynamic behavior of homicide rates. First, there
may be other changes taking places simultaneously with prohibition of mahogany trade. In
particular, prohibition has economic impacts that may indirectly affect the incidence of
violence. We try to control for three dimensions that may be of concern: (i) prohibition of
mahogany may reduce income in certain areas and reduce labor market opportunities, so we
control for a large set of state level socioeconomic characteristics (unemployment rate,
percentage of informal workers, fraction of household with more than 2 members per room,
and inequality); (ii) prohibition may be related to changes in the pattern of agricultural activity16
and this may also be intrinsically related to violence in the agricultural frontier, so we control
for fraction of municipality area planted and fraction of state population occupied in
agriculture; and (iii) some of the mahogany areas are remote regions of the country, that may
be going through modernization changes and increased urbanization, so we control for state
level access to various public goods and indicators of urbanization (enrollment rate between
ages 7 and 14, percentage of population living in households with access to treated water,
percentage of population living in households with toilet connected to the public sewerage
system, illiteracy rate in the population above 15, and household electricity consumption per
capita).
As discussed in the previous section, most of these variables are available only at the
state level, while only area planted is available at the municipality level. To partly address this
limitation, in some robustness exercises we resort to the type of data that we do have yearly at
the municipality level: mortality records. We use as additional controls in some specifications
mortality rates for infectious diseases, neoplasms, heart and circulatory conditions, suicides,
traffic accidents, and also overall mortality before age 5. Infectious diseases, neoplasms, and
heart and circulatory conditions are intended to capture broad mortality trends at the
municipality level, and also possibly changes in registration. Suicides and traffic accidents
should control for changes associated with modernization and urbanization, while mortality
under age five (and also possibly infectious diseases) can be seen as a control for local living
conditions and economic development.
Finally, when controlling for mortality patterns, we also include the number of political
deaths associated with land conflict. Lack of well defined property rights in the Brazilian
agricultural frontier is commonly associated with violent land disputes (see Alston et al, 2000,
and Altson and Mueller, 2010). Since part of this agricultural frontier is located in the Brazilian
Amazon, overlapping some of the mahogany area, one might be worried about confounding
effects of land conflict in our estimation.
We conduct our analysis for different samples and using different sets of controls. Part
of the analysis restricts the sample to municipalities in states with natural occurrence of
mahogany, and then only to municipalities in the state of Pará. Treatment and control groups
are more homogeneous within these specific areas (see Tables 1 and 2), and the state of Pará is
particularly relevant because it accounts for more than 70% of mahogany exports before17
prohibition. But, on the other hand, contamination of the control group is more likely over
smaller areas and state level controls are not very useful in this case. So, given the relative
strengths of the different samples, we keep all of them throughout the paper.
The second issue raised relates to the possibility of differential dynamic behavior of
homicides in mahogany occurring areas, even before the imposition of restrictions on logging
and trade. Figure 2 suggests that this was not the case, but we explore this possibility by
assessing whether there is any evidence of differential preexisting trends in homicide in areas
associated with mahogany production.
There are some remaining methodological issues that we deal with in our estimation: (i)
as the variance of homicide rates is directly related to population size, we weight all regressions
by population size; and (ii) as the difference-in-differences strategy may lead to
underestimation of standard errors due to autocorrelation in the residuals, we cluster standard
errors at either the state or municipality level (depending on the treatment variable), allowing
for an arbitrary structure of correlation over time (as suggested by Bertrand et al, 2004).
5. Results: Illegal Mahogany Trade after Prohibition
The analysis in this section is closely related to a growing body of literature on detection
of illegal activities, exemplified by Fisman and Wei (2004), Fisman et al (2009), and Della Vigna
and La Ferrara (2010). Table 3 presents the estimated structural breaks for exports of “other
tropical timber species” and Figure 3 plots the corresponding data. The results on the left
portion of the table are based on monthly exports, while the right portion uses total annual
exports. Whereas the number of observations is much larger when we use monthly
information, higher frequency data can be more volatile and mask longer run movements in the
series. We therefore report our results for both series.
We also report our estimates when we control for exports of cedar, ipe and virola-balsa.
As mentioned before, cedar and ipe are imperfect substitutes for mahogany, and jumps in their
exports could reflect systematic changes in demand for timber from the Amazon as a response
to mahogany prohibition. Virola-balsa is a softer type of timber with very different uses than
mahogany. We include it as a control to capture potential overall movements in the
international trade of timber from the Amazon, independent from the mahogany market.
When analyzing the annual series, we drop the variable for ipe from our set of controls, since18
the minimum time interval between two structural breaks in Bai and Perron (1998) has to be
greater than the number of regressors in the model. This means that, with the annual data, the
inclusion of three controls plus the constant would force the structural breaks to be at least five
years apart.
The table presents estimated break dates in bold (month of the year in parenthesis),
followed by their corresponding confidence intervals. Since Bai and Perron’s (1998) algorithm
uses integers for dates, confidence intervals formed by time spans smaller than the time unit of
the series are not reported and appear as NA. The first structural break for our monthly series
occurs on August 1999, following suspension of 85% of all forest management plans used to
back up extraction of big leaf mahogany. The suspended management plans were located in the
state of Pará and affected the largest producers of mahogany, who effectively lost their ability
to formally extract and sell this resource. The structural break taking place on August 1999
corresponds to an increase of 1,800% in the Brazilian exports of “other tropical timber species”
in one single month.
14 When we focus on the annual series, the first structural break occurs in
1998 and reflects the increase in exports taking place on August of the following year, as
described above.
The second structural break that appears in our four models occurs sometime between
2001 and 2003. This break is consistent with two institutional changes affecting the mahogany
market: i) prohibition of extraction, transportation and trade of big leaf mahogany imposed by
Brazilian authorities in the end of 2001, and ii) inclusion of big leaf mahogany in Appendix II of
CITES, which might have signaled that prohibition was likely to be maintained. We therefore
find support to the hypothesis that the drastic contraction of the formal mahogany market in
1999 and prohibition in late 2001 have contributed to the flourishing of an illegal market in the
main producing states.
15,16
14 Most of the exports of “other tropical timber species” came from the state of Pará, the largest producer of
mahogany. Estimating structural breaks for exports of “other tropical timber species” from Pará produces identical
point estimates and minor variations in the confidence intervals for the monthly series. Estimates of break dates
for the states where mahogany naturally occurs are available from the authors upon request.
15 When analyzing total Brazilian exports of “other tropical timber species” to the European Union and the United
States for the time span ranging from January 1989 to December 2006, Chimeli and Boyd (2010) estimate
structural breaks in August 1999 and sometime in the time span ranging from September 2002 to April 2004,
depending on the consumer market and taking into account confidence intervals.
16 If we ignore the problem alluded to above and estimate the model with annual series using our entire set of
controls (three controls for the different types of timber plus the intercept), we artificially estimate the first break
in 1997, five years before the second break in 2002. However, visual inspection of the series for “other tropical19
6. Results: Mahogany Prohibition and Violence
Table 4 presents the results for our benchmark specification. The table displays the
coefficients estimated with the specification from equation 4, without the inclusion of any
control, when the five different treatments are considered: (i) mahogany occurring region
interacted with treatment years; (ii) pre-prohibition state share of mahogany exports interacted
with treatment years; (iii) mahogany occurring region interacted with pre-prohibition share of
exports and with treatment years; (iv) state “suspected mahogany exports” interacted with
treatment years; and (v) mahogany occurring region interacted with “suspected mahogany
exports” and with treatment years.
The results show a significant effect of the second treatment variable, associated with
the shutdown of the legal mahogany market, in all specifications. The coefficient on the first
policy change (treat 1999) is also quantitatively much smaller than that on the second one
(treat 2002). Areas in the region of natural occurrence of mahogany, states with higher share of
mahogany exports before prohibition, and states with higher “suspected mahogany exports”
after prohibition all experienced relative increases in homicide rates after 2001. In addition, the
triple difference estimates from columns 3 and 5 lead to coefficients substantially higher than
their respective double difference counterparts (columns 2 and 4). This suggests that the most
pernicious effects of prohibition were observed in areas that had natural occurrence of
mahogany and where mahogany commercial activity was relevant (either legally before
prohibition or illegally after prohibition). This pattern is consistent with the logic behind our
identification strategy and the anecdotal evidence discussed in section 2.
In Table 5, we include state and municipal controls. For each treatment variable, we
present columns with only the state controls added and then with the state and municipal
controls. If anything, results are typically stronger when the additional controls are included
and, in several cases, the first treatment variable (treat 1999), which was not significant,
becomes statistically significant. The fact that point estimates are not reduced when we include
the controls indicates that the changes in homicide we are detecting are not related to changes
timber species” suggests that no unusual changes took place in 1997. Dropping the series for cedar instead of ipe
in the estimation with the annual series produces results analogous to those presented in the table, with one
structural break in 1998 and another in 2003, and no estimated confidence intervals in either case.20
in state level economic activity, socioeconomic conditions, urbanization, nor to municipality
changes in the pattern of agricultural activity.
Following, we restrict the sample in two different ways to deal with potential concerns
related to the comparability of treatment and control groups. First, we look at states with some
natural occurrence of mahogany, so that we end up with only 7 states. In Table 6, we present
results without controls and with both state and municipality controls. Some of these results
should be interpreted with caution, given that the export variables vary only at the state level.
This implies that, for columns 3, 4, 7, and 8, we have only 7 cross-sectional units of variation in
the treatment (we still cluster standard errors at the state level in these cases, but there are
potentially serious concerns related to the small number of clusters). In any case, point
estimates are slightly smaller than those obtained before, but qualitative results remain almost
identical. Even within mahogany occurring states, mahogany occurring areas experience
significant increases in violence when compared to other areas.
In Table 7 we go one step further and restrict the sample only to the state of Pará. Given
that Pará accounted for most of the mahogany production before prohibition, and that a major
part of the illegal activity is thought to take place there, it deserves particular attention. In
addition, Table 2 and Figure 2 showed that there is much less municipality heterogeneity within
Pará than across Brazil as a whole, so that this exercise may help diminish concerns related to
heterogeneity between treatment and control. Given that we are restricting the analysis to a
single state, all we can do is compare municipalities inside and outside the area of natural
occurrence of mahogany, before and after the institutional changes. We run this specification
with and without the control for municipality area planted. These results are comparable to
columns 1 from Table 4, and columns 1 and 2 from Table 5. Results are of similar magnitude but
typically larger than those obtained before, with both treatments appearing as positive and
statistically significant. So our previous results do not seem to be driven by unobserved
heterogeneity across control and treatment groups. Looking only at the state of Pará, we are
still able to detect a statistically significant increase in homicide rates in mahogany occurring
areas when compared to other areas. If anything, differences are starker within Pará than
across Brazil as a whole.
The only remaining limitation might be that we do not have enough municipality
controls, and municipalities associated with mahogany could be going through other changes21
around this same period. In order to address this potential concern, we conduct two additional
exercises. First, we control for a broad set of mortality rates, which we do observe yearly at the
municipality level. These mortality rates capture changes in overall mortality patterns across
areas (heart and circulatory diseases, neoplasms, and infectious diseases), changes in
socioeconomic conditions (mortality before age five and, to some extent, also infectious
diseases), and changes in urbanization or modernization (traffic accidents and suicides).
17 In
addition, we also control for deaths associated with land conflicts, to disentangle the violence
we are identifying from that related to land control in the agricultural frontier.
Following, we deal with the possibility that the treatment variables are capturing distinct
dynamics of violence in mahogany regions. If this was the case, one would expect these
dynamics to be present already before the restrictions on mahogany exploration and trade
were imposed. To assess this possibility, we introduce variables trying to account for pre-
intervention trends in homicide rates.
18 The pre-1999 placebos used vary according to the
treatment variable: (i) a dummy for 1997-1998 interacted with the treatment variables
(mahogany occurring areas, pre-1999 share of mahogany exports, and the interaction of these
two) for the first three cases, (ii) an interaction of “suspected mahogany exports” with a pre-
1999 dummy for the fourth treatment, and (iii) an interaction of these two variables with
mahogany occurring areas for the last treatment.
Results from these last two robustness tests are presented in Tables 8 and 9, for all
treatments and all samples considered before. In Table 8, the inclusion of mortality controls
leads to results that are, in most cases, quantitatively similar to those obtained when we did
not include any control. As in those results, the first treatment (treat 1999) is not statistically
significant, while the second (treat 2002) is.
In Table 9, none of the pre-intervention placebos appear as statistically significant. The
vast majority of estimated coefficients on pre-intervention variables is very small in magnitude,
while the effects of the treatments are again similar to those estimated before. So there is no
17 One may imagine that a certain fraction of “extremely successful” murders go unnoticed, or at least are not
registered by the health system as such. If so, it seems plausible that some of these might be registered as deaths
due to traffic accidents, suicides, or even heart attacks. In this case, our strategy will underestimate the effect of
prohibition on homicides.
18 We conduct the preexisting trends exercises with the specification without controls since it has a more complete
sample in terms of year coverage. The results are identical when we include the controls, but since in this case the
data have less coverage across years, we think it is actually a weaker test.22
evidence that our treatment variables are capturing differential dynamic behavior of homicide
rates that were already present before the introduction of restrictions to mahogany trade, or
that they reflect other changes taking place at the municipality level. In this respect, notice that
columns 5 and 10 of Table 9 represent particularly strong tests of our hypothesis: they imply
that, in mahogany occurring areas, state level “suspected mahogany exports” are significantly
correlated with homicide rates after prohibition, but not before. This rules out not only pre-
existing trends, but also alternative stories that would associate violence intrinsically to
mahogany exploration.
Our final exercise presents one additional piece of evidence to lend support to the
specific story outlined in section 2. In order to shed some light on the nature of the increase in
violence detected here, we break down homicide rates by demographic characteristics: gender,
age, and marital status. For brevity, we consider only our simplest treatment variable
(interaction of mahogany areas with treatment years) and run our benchmark specification
with the three different samples. Results are presented in Table 10, where first we break down
homicide rates by gender and then, considering only males, break it down again by age group
and marital status (in the latter case, since we do not have population by marital status, we
simply divide homicide rates by the entire male population). Qualitative results are identical
across the three samples: the increase in violence we are detecting is fundamentally driven by
violence against prime-aged single men. Since this is also the group most likely to be involved in
illegal activities and, more generally, crime, we believe this result lends additional support to
the specific hypothesis raised in the paper. For example, looking at the state of Pará only, the
increase in homicide rates is 19 times larger for men than for women, 9 times larger for prime-
aged men than for other age groups, and 7 times larger for single men than for married men.
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To conclude our discussion of the results, we turn to the quantitative aspect of the
estimated coefficients. For ease of computation and visual comparison, consider the
coefficients in columns 1, 6, and 11 from Table 9. These can be immediately read as the
increases in homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants after mahogany prohibition, when each of
the three samples is considered (the other treatments would require slightly more
cumbersome calculations to deliver a concrete quantitative analysis). Comparing with the 1998
19 These also represent relative increases in homicide rates for prime-aged single men (taking the 1998 homicide
level as the reference point).23
average homicide rate in each respective sample, these estimated coefficients correspond to
increases of roughly 40% when considering the sample with the entire country or with
mahogany occurring states, and of 114% when considering only the state of Pará. For the
median municipality in the mahogany occurring areas of Pará (around 18,500 inhabitants), this
effect corresponds to 2.8 additional homicides every year. From 1995 to 2007, the effect for
Pará adds up to 1,998 additional deaths due to illegal mahogany activity.
Despite seeming exaggeratedly large, the coefficient for Pará is in fact quite reasonable
when put in perspective of the recent experience of the state: it explains 93% of the differential
increase in homicide rates between mahogany and non-mahogany occurring areas, illustrated
before in Figure 2(c). The fact is that the state had relatively low incidence of violence in 1995,
but by 2007 it had become a very violent area. Since the mahogany market is estimated to
correspond roughly to 1% of its yearly GDP, it seems plausible that most of this spike in violence
was due to increased illegal logging and the context of violence that followed.
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper presents evidence of the increase in violence in Brazilian regions with natural
occurrence or trade of mahogany, following the introduction of increasingly restrictive
regulations and eventual prohibition of mahogany exploration. Much has been said in the
popular press and the academic literature about the intrinsic association between market
illegality and the use of violence. Still, there is very little if any direct causal evidence on this
relationship. We present what we believe is the first piece of evidence on the increase in
violence following the complete shutdown of a legal market. The increase in homicides we
document is not related to changes in socioeconomic conditions, pre-existing trends in
violence, or pernicious or degrading effects of the consumption of the good itself. Our evidence
points to a causal effect of market illegality, per se, on the incidence of systemic violence.24
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A.1 Area of Natural Occurrence of Mahogany in the Brazilian Territory, reproduced from
Grogan et al (2002)29
A.2 Construction of Export Series
Between January 1989 and December 1995, the Brazilian government used the Brazilian
Merchandise Nomenclature (NBM) to code products internationally traded. In January 1996,
Brazil started adopting the Mercosur Merchandise Nomenclature (NCM) also used by
Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Since most merchandise codes were either consolidated or
expanded in the new classification system, MDIC then compiled a list to convert NBM into NCM
codes. We used this list to construct our series.
International trade data were reported using both systems in 1996 and we used
monthly data for this year to check for possible discrepancies associated with the two
classification systems. The case of mahogany exports was straightforward (4407.24.10 in the
NCM system corresponds to 4407.23.0102 and 4407.23.0201 in the NBM system) with no
discrepancies in 1996. As for other tropical species, exports according to the NCM system
(4407.29.90) do not match the summation of the corresponding NBM codes in 1996
(4407.21.0100, 4407.21.0200, 4407.21.9900, 4407.22.0100, 4407.22.0200, 4407.22.9900,
4407.23.0199 and 4407.23.0299). Exports of other tropical species in 1996 according to the
NCM system were nil for all Brazilian states, whereas they were positive for parts of the year
according to the NBM system. The states that had positive exports were Amazonas, Mato
Grosso and Pará, all of them in the Amazon region and with parts of their territory overlapping
the area where big leaf mahogany naturally occurs. Their joint exports totaled 1,595,578 Kg in
1996, corresponding to about 2.4% of the annual average for these states between 1989 and
2007. Visual inspection of the data suggests structural breaks in the exports of other tropical
species starting in 1999. Since we build our series using the summation of NBM codes prior to
1997, we err on the safe side and make the test for structural breaks more stringent.
We used the same approach to build the series for cedar, ipe and virola-balsa. Cedar’s
codes are 4408.39.10 from 1996 through 2007 (NCM) and 4407.99.0199, 4407.99.0201 and
4407.99.0399 from 1989 through 1996 (NBM). By using 1996 as a validation year, we build the
series using only code 4407.99.0201 for the earlier period. Ipe’s codes are 4407.29.20 (NCM),
and 4407.99.0199, 4407.99.0208 and 4407.99.0303 (NBM). We use only the last two NBM
codes to build our ipe series. Virola-Balsa’s codes are 4407.24.90 (NCM) and 4407.23.0199,
4407.23.0299, 4407.99.0102, 4407.99.0205, 4407.99.0301 and 4407.99.0399 (NBM). We ignore
NBM codes 4407.24.90 and 4407.99.0399 in the construction of our virola-balsa series.Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Brazilian Municipalities
Year
Municipalities outside Mahogany Occurrence Area
(N=4,811)
Municipalities inside Mahogany Occurrence Area
(N=163)
homicides access water gdp p.c. homicides access water gdp p.c.
(per 100,000) (%) (1,000s in 2000 R$) (per 100,000) (%) (1,000s in 2000 R$)
1995 23.92 0.78 . 18.21 0.64 .
1996 24.90 0.82 6.11 18.81 0.70 2.54
1997 25.84 0.82 . 20.84 0.69 .
1998 26.34 0.83 . 23.16 0.72 .
1999 26.64 0.84 6.78 21.54 0.72 3.45
2000 27.09 . 6.80 25.55 . 3.54
2001 28.19 0.86 6.76 27.82 0.71 3.61
2002 28.72 0.87 7.20 30.95 0.75 3.79
2003 29.13 0.88 7.18 31.14 0.74 3.98
2004 27.12 0.88 7.49 31.65 0.68 4.34
2005 25.87 0.89 7.52 31.56 0.72 4.35
2006 26.36 0.90 7.71 33.75 0.75 4.32
2007 25.24 0.91 8.24 30.83 0.76 4.66
Obs.: Averages weighted by state population. Variables are homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants, percentage of individuals living in households with access
to treated water (measured at state level), and gdp per capita in 2000 R$ (thousands).Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Brazilian Municipalities
Panel A: STATES WITH SOME MAHOGANY OCCURRENCE
Municipalities outside Mahogany Occurrence
Area (N=465)
Municipalities inside Mahogany Occurrence
Area (N=163)
year homicides access water gdp p.c. homicides access water gdp p.c.
(per 100,000) (%) (1,000s in 2000 R$) (per 100,000) (%) (1,000s in 2000 R$)
1995 13.26 0.50 . 18.21 0.64 .
1996 13.59 0.57 3.06 18.81 0.70 2.54
1997 14.76 0.57 . 20.84 0.69 .
1998 15.62 0.59 . 23.16 0.72 .
1999 13.70 0.61 3.63 21.54 0.72 3.45
2000 15.43 . 3.85 25.55 . 3.54
2001 16.74 0.64 3.89 27.82 0.71 3.61
2002 17.02 0.69 4.12 30.95 0.75 3.79
2003 18.77 0.69 4.30 31.14 0.74 3.98
2004 17.68 0.63 4.76 31.65 0.68 4.34
2005 20.98 0.66 4.66 31.56 0.72 4.35
2006 22.32 0.71 4.69 33.75 0.75 4.32
2007 22.93 0.72 4.99 30.83 0.76 4.66
Panel B: STATE OF PARÁ
Municipalities outside Mahogany Occurrence
Area (N=83)
Municipalities inside Mahogany Occurrence
Area (N=45)
year homicides access water gdp p.c. homicides access water gdp p.c.
(per 100,000) (%) (1,000s in 2000 R$) (per 100,000) (%) (1,000s in 2000 R$)
1995 12.96 0.53 . 12.10 0.53 .
1996 12.37 0.61 2.77 12.82 0.61 1.88
1997 13.41 0.60 . 13.69 0.60 .
1998 14.00 0.58 . 12.18 0.58 .
1999 9.36 0.64 3.07 15.53 0.64 2.83
2000 10.78 . 3.15 21.09 . 3.07
2001 13.13 0.67 3.33 21.73 0.67 3.13
2002 15.51 0.70 3.40 27.60 0.70 3.20
2003 17.72 0.69 3.35 30.90 0.69 3.31
2004 17.47 0.60 3.58 36.53 0.60 3.67
2005 24.21 0.61 3.50 37.79 0.61 3.66
2006 25.50 0.65 3.65 40.25 0.65 3.91
2007 25.86 0.69 3.85 43.35 0.69 4.16
Obs.: Averages weighted by municipality population. Variables are homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants, percentage of
individuals living in households with access to treated water (measured at state level), and gdp per capita in 2000 R$ (thousands).
Top panel includes only municipalities in states with some natural occurrence of mahogany, and bottom panel includes only
municipalities in the state of Pará.Table 3: Breakpoints in Brazilian exports of "other tropical species"
Monthly exports Annual exports
No Controls No Controls
Break Dates 95% Confidence Interval Break Dates 95% Confidence Interval
1999(8) NA NA 1998 NA NA
2003(6) 2003(4) 2003(8) 2002 2001 2003
With Controls (Cedar, Ipe and Virola-Balsa) With Controls (Cedar and Virola-Balsa)
Break Dates 95% Confidence Interval Break Dates 95% Confidence Interval
1999(8) NA NA 1998 NA NA
2003(6) 2003(5) 2003(9) 2002 2001 2003
Obs.: Variable is export of other tropical timber species. Series cover the period from 1989 to 2007. Table reports the results of the Bai and Perron (1998) structural
break test, with estimated break dates and respective confidence intervals.Table 4: Illegality of Mahogany Trade and Homicides, Brazilian Municipalities, 1995-2007, Difference-in-differences
Sample: All States
Treatment: Mahog Area x Treat
Years
Pre-1999 Mahog Exp x
Treat Years
Mahog Area x Pre-





Suspected Mahog Exp x
Treat Years
1 2 3 4 5
treat 1999 2.821 -2.168 6.874 -0.0250 0.0465
[2.176] [2.658] [4.634] [0.0225] [0.0312]
treat 2002 9.761** 15.63** 30.41*** 0.0760** 0.148***
[3.925] [5.760] [8.534] [0.0303] [0.0403]
Observations 64,662 64,662 64,662 64,662 64,662
R-squared 0.734 0.735 0.735 0.736 0.735
Obs.: Robust standard-errors in brackets (clustering at state for columns 2 and 4, and at municipality for the others); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent variable is the homicide rate (per 100,000 inhabitants). All regressions include a constant, municipality and year dummies, and are weighted by
population. 27 states. Treatment variables are dummies=1 between 1999-2001 and after 2002 interacted with: dummy of mahogany occurring area; state
share in total pre-1999 mahogany exports; sum of state exports of mahogany and “other tropical timber species” (which we call “virtual exports of
mahogany”); and interactions of the latter two with mahogany occurring area.Table 5: Illegality of Mahogany Trade and Homicides, Controls Included, Brazilian Municipalities, 1995-2007, Difference-in-differences
Sample: All States
Treatment: Mahog Area x Treat Years Pre-1999 Mahog Exp x Treat Years Mahog Area x Pre-1999 Mahog
Exp x Treat Years
Suspected Mahog Exp x Treat
Years
Mahog Area x Suspected Mahog
Exp x Treat Years
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
treat 1999 7.486** 6.228*** 1.369 2.102 9.087** 8.875** -0.000236 0.00786 0.0612** 0.0620**
[2.945] [2.272] [2.739] [2.179] [4.020] [3.708] [0.0243] [0.0169] [0.0261] [0.0251]
treat 2002 17.22*** 12.33*** 21.56*** 16.13*** 35.22*** 30.57*** 0.112*** 0.0805*** 0.164*** 0.145***
[4.033] [2.886] [5.105] [3.029] [7.453] [6.995] [0.0274] [0.0158] [0.0333] [0.0329]
state controls X X X X X X X X X X
municip control X X X X X
Observations 54,713 54,138 54,713 54,138 54,713 54,138 54,713 54,138 54,713 54,138
R-squared 0.748 0.786 0.749 0.787 0.748 0.787 0.749 0.787 0.748 0.787
Obs.: Robust standard-errors in brackets (clustering at state for columns 2 and 4, and at municipality for the others); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is the homicide rate (per 100,000
inhabitants). State controls are: ratio of top 10% to bottom 40% of income distrib, poverty rates, % of household with more than 2 members per room, primary enrollment rate btwn 7 and 14, informality in labor
force, % pop with access to water, % pop with access to sewage, % labor force in agriculture, unemployment, illiteracy, electricity consumption p.c. (ln). Municipality control is % of area planted. All regressions
include a constant, municipality and year dummies, and are weighted by population. 27 states. Treatment variables are dummies=1 between 1999-2001 and after 2002 interacted with: dummy of mahogany
occurring area; state share in total pre-1999 mahogany exports; sum of state exports of mahogany and “other tropical timber species” (which we call “virtual exports of mahogany”); and interactions of the latter
two with mahogany occurring area.Table 6: Illegality of Mahogany Trade and Homicides, Municipalities in Mahogany Occurring States, 1995-2007, Difference-in-differences
Sample: Mahogany Occurring States
Treatment: Mahog Area x Treat Years Pre-1999 Mahog Exp x Treat Years Mahog Area x Pre-1999 Mahog
Exp x Treat Years
Suspected Mahog Exp x Treat
Years
Mahog Area x Suspected Mahog
Exp x Treat Years
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
treat 1999 4.089* 3.403 -2.705 -3.287 8.218* 5.891* -0.0231 -0.0336 0.0462 0.0353
[2.212] [2.112] [1.932] [2.183] [4.622] [3.422] [0.0134] [0.0190] [0.0307] [0.0252]
treat 2002 6.071* 10.20*** 10.20** 9.855** 25.12*** 25.64*** 0.0512** 0.0510** 0.115*** 0.117***
[3.149] [3.266] [3.342] [3.693] [7.750] [7.230] [0.0169] [0.0171] [0.0363] [0.0332]
state controls X X X X X
municip control X X X X X
Observations 8,164 6,876 8,164 6,876 8,164 6,876 8,164 6,876 8,164 6,876
R-squared 0.701 0.724 0.707 0.722 0.710 0.729 0.709 0.723 0.710 0.729
Obs.: Robust standard-errors in brackets (clustering at state for columns 2 and 4, and at municipality for the others); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is the homicide rate (per 100,000
inhabitants). State controls are: ratio of top 10% to bottom 40% of income distrib, poverty rates, % of household with more than 2 members per room, primary enrollment rate btwn 7 and 14, informality in labor
force, % pop with access to water, % pop with access to sewage, % labor force in agriculture, unemployment, illiteracy, electricity consumption p.c. (ln). Municipality control is % of area planted. All regressions
include a constant, municipality and year dummies, and are weighted by population. Only 7 (mahogany occurring) states. Treatment variables are dummies=1 between 1999-2001 and after 2002 interacted with:
dummy of mahogany occurring area; state share in total pre-1999 mahogany exports; sum of state exports of mahogany and “other tropical timber species” (which we call “virtual exports of mahogany”); and
interactions of the latter two with mahogany occurring area.Table 7: Illegality of Mahogany Trade and Homicides, Municipalities in
the State of Pará, 1995-2007, Difference-in-differences
Sample: Pará
Treatment: Mahog Area x Treat Years
1 2
treat 1999 8.877** 8.725**
[3.545] [3.715]





Obs.: Robust standard-errors in brackets (clustering at municipality); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Dependent variable is the homicide rate (per 100,000 inhabitants). Municipality
control is % of area planted. All regressions include a constant, municipality and year
dummies, and are weighted by population. Only state of Pará. Treatment variable are
dummies=1 between 1999-2001 and after 2002 interacted with dummy of mahogany
occurring area.Table 8: Illegality of Mahogany Trade and Homicides, Controlling for Mortality Patterns, Brazilian Municipalities, 1995-2007, Difference-in-differences
Sample: All States Mahogany Occurring States Pará


































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
treat 1999 4.098* 1.550 6.245* 0.00385 0.0424* 1.966 -1.448 3.830 -0.0154 0.0206 4.335
[2.093] [2.306] [3.623] [0.0180] [0.0249] [1.655] [1.887] [3.561] [0.0171] [0.0255] [3.556]
treat 2002 9.248*** 14.80*** 25.99*** 0.0742*** 0.124*** 7.456** 9.282** 21.02*** 0.0501** 0.0964*** 12.00**
[2.967] [3.123] [7.191] [0.0155] [0.0336] [3.079] [3.289] [7.653] [0.0153] [0.0352] [5.261]
mortality
controls X X X X X X X X X X X
state and/or
muni controls X X X X X X X X X X X
Observations 54,118 54,118 54,118 54,118 54,118 6,856 6,856 6,856 6,856 6,856 1,609
R-squared 0.807 0.808 0.808 0.808 0.808 0.750 0.749 0.754 0.750 0.754 0.775
Obs.: Robust standard-errors in brackets (clustering at state for columns 2, 4, 7, and 9, and at municipality for the others); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is the homicide rate (per 100,000
inhabitants). State controls are: ratio of top 10% to bottom 40% of income distrib, poverty rates, % of household with more than 2 members per room, primary enrollment rate btwn 7 and 14, informality in
labor force, % pop with access to water, % pop with access to sewage, % labor force in agriculture, unemployment, illiteracy, electricity consumption p.c. (ln). Municipality control is % of area planted. Mortality
controls (at municipality level are): heart and circulatory diseases, neoplasms, infectious diseases, traffic accidents, suicides, mortality before age 5, and number of murders related to land conflicts. All
regressions include a constant, municipality and year dummies, and are weighted by population. Various samples. Treatment variables are dummies=1 between 1999-2001 and after 2002 interacted with:
dummy of mahogany occurring area; state share in total pre-1999 mahogany exports; sum of state exports of mahogany and “other tropical timber species” (which we call “virtual exports of mahogany”); and
interactions of the latter two with mahogany occurring area.Table 9: Illegality of Mahogany Trade and Homicides, Testing for Pre-Existing Trends, Brazilian Municipalities, 1995-2007, Difference-in-differences
Sample: All States Mahogany Occurring States Pará


































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
treat 1999 3.743 -2.433 6.424 -0.0831 0.0329 5.122* -3.408 7.522 -0.0274 -0.00933 8.494**
[3.350] [3.440] [5.323] [0.117] [0.0330] [3.022] [3.108] [4.630] [0.0370] [0.0311] [3.704]
treat 2002 10.68** 15.36** 29.96*** 0.0367 0.139*** 7.106** 9.495*** 24.43*** 0.0482 0.0776** 15.15***
[4.908] [5.812] [9.178] [0.0776] [0.0418] [3.352] [2.484] [7.264] [0.0323] [0.0361] [5.567]
pre-existing 1.852 -0.527 -0.887 -0.184 -0.0429 2.079 -1.408 -1.375 -0.0137 -0.176 -0.755
trend [3.147] [1.881] [4.235] [0.323] [0.103] [2.458] [2.706] [2.629] [0.107] [0.109] [2.310]
Observations 64,662 64,662 64,662 64,662 64,662 8,164 8,164 8,164 8,164 8,164 1,664
R-squared 0.734 0.735 0.735 0.736 0.735 0.701 0.707 0.710 0.709 0.710 0.727
Obs.: Robust standard-errors in brackets (clustering at state for columns 2 and 4, and at municipality for the others); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is the homicide rate (per 100,000
inhabitants). All regressions include a constant, municipality and year dummies, and are weighted by population. 27 states. Treatment variables are dummies=1 between 1999-2001 and after 2002 interacted
with: dummy of mahogany occurring area; state share in total pre-1999 mahogany exports; sum of state exports of mahogany and “other tropical timber species” (which we call “virtual exports of mahogany”);
and interactions of the latter two with mahogany occurring area. Pre-1999 placebos vary according to the treatment variable: (i) a dummy for 1997-1998 interacted with the treatment variables (mahogany
occurring areas, pre-1999 share of mahogany exports, and the interaction of these two) for the first three cases, (ii) an interaction of “virtual exports of mahogany” with a pre-1999 dummy for the fourth
treatment, and (iii) an interaction of these two variables with mahogany occurring areas for the last treatment.Table 10: Illegality of Mahogany Trade and Homicides, Characterization of Victims, Brazilian States, 1995-2007, Difference-in-
differences
Treatment in all cases: Mahog Area x Treat Years
Panel A Sample: All States
Gender Male by Age Group Male by Marital Status
male female 15-49 other single married
treat 1999 4.553 0.441 7.968 1.521 3.308 1.176*
[3.872] [0.612] [6.606] [1.043] [3.230] [0.605]
treat 2002 17.98** 0.534 29.76** 3.457** 15.44** 1.849**
[7.429] [0.554] [12.27] [1.456] [6.229] [0.737]
Panel B Sample: Mahogany Occurring States
Gender Male by Age Group Male by Marital Status
male female 15-49 other single married
treat 1999 7.454* 0.748 12.16* 1.892 7.148** 1.251**
[4.168] [0.613] [6.996] [1.230] [3.504] [0.624]
treat 2002 11.20* 0.331 18.13* 2.575* 11.49** 1.323*
[6.063] [0.502] [10.03] [1.443] [5.342] [0.722]
Panel C Sample: Pará
Gender Male by Age Group Male by Marital Status
male female 15-49 other single married
treat 1999 16.13** 1.300 25.36** 6.181*** 13.05** 3.186**
[6.766] [0.869] [11.74] [1.463] [5.449] [1.349]
treat 2002 28.00** 1.479** 48.93** 5.803*** 25.85** 3.587**
[11.20] [0.728] [19.53] [2.044] [10.29] [1.459]
Obs.: Robust standard-errors in brackets (clustering at municipality); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is the homicide rate (per 100,000
inhabitants) by demographic group. All regressions include a constant, municipality and year dummies, and are weighted by population. 27 states. Treatment
















































































































































(b) Municipalitiesin Stateswith MahoganyOccurrence,1995-2007




























(c) Municipalitiesin theStateof Pará, 1995-2007




October 2001Figure 3: Exports of “Other Tropical Timber Species” from Brazil, 1989-2007 – Monthly and
Annual Data